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11.1 Introduction
Currently it is crucial for the Japanese government to implement tight
public debt policy, because the Japanese government has issued a very huge
amount of government debts. Japan’s ﬁscal situation has deteriorated rap-
idly with the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s and the deep
and prolonged period of economic recession that ensued, and from which
recovery has been slow and modest despite the implementation of counter-
cyclical Keynesian policy. Since national income did not grow much, tax rev-
enue did not increase either. On the contrary, government spending has
been gradually raised due to political pressures of interest groups, result-
ing in large budget deﬁcits.
In 1997, the Japanese government tried to implement the Fiscal Struc-
tural Reform so as to reduce budget deﬁcits. However, in 1998, it stopped
the reform and reduced taxes and increased public investment based on the
traditional Keynesian policy because of the severe economic and ﬁnancial
situation, and the defeat of the governing party (the Liberal Democratic
Party) in the Upper House election.
Takero Doi is an associate professor of economics at Keio University. Toshihiro Ihori is a
professor of economics at the University of Tokyo. Kiyoshi Mitsui is a professor of econom-
ics at Gakushuin University.
An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 16th Annual East Asian Seminar on
Economics held on June 23–25, 2005, and the Conference on New Perspective of Fiscal Sus-
tainability, Goethe University Frankfurt Campus Westend, October 13 and 14, 2005. The au-
thors thank Professors Dante Canlas, Takatoshi Ito, Anne O. Krueger, Eli Remolona, An-
drew Rose, and Jürgen von Hagen, as well as the participants for helpful comments. Any
remaining errors are our own.
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Sustainability, Debt Management,
and Public Debt Policy in Japan
Takero Doi, Toshihiro Ihori, and Kiyoshi MitsuiThe concern for sustainability of ﬁscal deﬁcits is a background for the ﬁs-
cal reconstruction and structural reform movement by the current Koizumi
Administration. The “Structural Reform of the Japanese Economy: Basic
Policies for Macroeconomic Development” was decided upon after accept-
ance of the report compiled by the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy,
an advisory council to the prime minister. In this report the core of policies
for the structural reform of the economic society was made clear. In part of
the policies shown, a goal to limit the amount of government bond issues to
less than 30 trillion yen in the ﬁscal 2002 budget, and afterward to achieve
a primary surplus, was set to show that there exists a necessity to take on
full-scale measures toward ﬁscal consolidation or ﬁscal reconstruction.
However, in order to cope with the bad situation of macroeconomy, 1.8 tril-
lion yen of the advance tax cuts were employed with a view to strengthen-
ing the competitiveness of industry, facilitating a smooth transference of
assets to the next generation, promoting a shift from saving to investment,
advancing eﬀective land use, and so on. The goal to limit the amount of gov-
ernment bond issues to less than 30 trillion yen in the ﬁscal 2002 budget was
ﬁnally abandoned. In the ﬁscal 2005, new government bond issues are 34.4
trillion yen and the bond dependency ratio rises to 41.8 percent.
If creditors fear that the government is going to be in a debt trap, the
long-term interest rate begins to rise, reﬂecting an enlarged credit risk. It is
noted that although the Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) have been is-
sued too much, their yields are the lowest among G7 countries in the bond
market. In this regard, despite its weakening credit ratings, the ten-year
JGB nominal yield of about 1.5 percent in 2005 remains lower than the
U.S. bond yield of about 1.8 percent registered during the Great Depres-
sion. However, we also have to pay attention to persistent deﬂation. Also,
the performance in the yield of the JGBs may not accurately reﬂect its
credit risk. The Japanese banking sector continues to purchase the JGBs
simply because short-term capital gains from the JGBs have been an easy
option to oﬀset the existing stock losses.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze sustainability issues of Japan’s
ﬁscal policy and then to discuss the debt management policy using theo-
retical models and numerical studies. We also investigate the desirable co-
ordination of ﬁscal and monetary authorities toward ﬁscal reconstruction.
This chapter consists of ﬁve sections. In section 11.2 we survey previ-
ous studies on sustainability issues. In section 11.3, we evaluate Japan’s
debt management policy by providing a theoretical model to analyze
public debt policy in a second-best case as a benchmark. We then imple-
ment a simple numerical analysis based on the smoothing rule derived by
the theoretical model. In section 11.4, we discuss the desirable coordina-
tion of monetary and ﬁscal authorities toward ﬁscal reconstruction by
explicitly investigating conﬁdence crisis of government debt and sponta-
378 Takero Doi, Toshihiro Ihori, and Kiyoshi Mitsuineous default of ﬁscal authority. Finally, concluding remarks follow in
section 11.5.
11.2 Sustainability Issues and Emergency Reform
11.2.1 Concerns about Sustainability
The events of the 1980s and 1990s in Japan suggest that when a govern-
ment becomes strapped for funds, it will tend to borrow from the world
credit market rather than raise taxes to ﬁnance additional public spending.
Indeed, many governments did either not raise broadly based taxes (e.g.,
the Thatcher government in Great Britain, the Reagan and Bush Adminis-
trations in the United States) or simply could not raise taxes to prevent
causing riots (e.g., countries in Latin American and Eastern Europe, ar-
guably, France in the reign of Louis XVI). There are long-term concerns
about the accumulated ﬁscal deﬁcit. An important one is whether such a
large deﬁcit can be sustained. The system will be paralyzed if public ﬁnance
collapses under the weight of massive deﬁcit. As a result, the ﬁnancial sys-
tem and the economy as a whole will be seriously aﬀected. An extreme case
of hyperinﬂation or default could develop.
The so-called chain-letter mechanism (or a Ponzi debt game) involves a
situation in which the future time path of taxes is ﬁxed and debt ﬁnance 
is used to pay for any additional public spending; debt issuance is thus
endogenously determined by the government’s budget constraint. If the
mechanism is sustainable, increased taxation need not necessarily be re-
quired in order to ﬁnance increased government spending as the economy
converges to the steady state equilibrium. If the mechanism is unsustain-
able, the government will eventually go bankrupt in the sense that it will be
unable to raise enough revenue to ﬁnance public spending and debt repay-
ment. As debt crowds out private capital formation, the economy will also
eventually go bankrupt if the mechanism fails. This suggests that studying
the chain-letter mechanism and associated sustainability issues is quite im-
portant in terms of understanding the eﬀects of government austerity (ﬁs-
cal reconstruction) measures on the macroeconomy.
A simple way to evaluate the ﬁscal sustainability problem is to focus on
the government bond market. In this regard for Japan, despite its weaken-
ing credit ratings, the ten-year JGB nominal yield of about 1.5 percent in
2005 remains. So far the myth that the JGBs are risk-free has been some-
how propagated. This episode may imply that Japan’s government solvency
is not a serious issue right now. However, Japan has experienced deep de-
ﬂation, so the real rate of interest is about 2 percent, which is not so low.
We also have to pay attention to the possibility that the performance in the
yield of the JGB may not accurately reﬂect its credit risk.
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test the ﬁscal sustainability condition, using the methodology of Hamilton
and Flavin (1986). Hamilton and Flavin (1986) deﬁne the sustainability of
government debt as follows. Government budget constraint in period t is
expressed as
Gt   (1   rt)Dt   Rt   Dt 1,
where Gt, Rt, rt, and Dt denote aggregate real government expenditure (ex-
cluding interest payment), aggregate real tax revenue, real interest rate,
and aggregate real bonds outstanding (at the beginning of period), respec-
tively. We can rewrite this as
Bt 1   Et ∑
n
i 1  
i
j 1     St i    Et  
n
j 1   Bt n 1 
where primary surplus St   Rt – Gt.





j 1   Dt n 1    0
as the condition of sustainability of government bond. The previous equa-
tion means no Ponzi game condition in dynamic macroeconomic models.
Therefore we can conﬁrm the sustainability of government bond by testing





j 1   Dt n 1    AA : constant
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) estimate the following regression to test the
sustainability:
Dt   c0   A(1   r)t   c1Dt 1         cpDt p   d1St 1   d2St 2
        dpSt p   εt
where εt denotes an error term. They assume that (expected) real interest
rate is constant over time, and expectations and error terms of the regres-
sion satisfy the relation that the term of Et[Σ 
i 1 (1/1   r)iSt i] depends on
St–1, St–2, . . . , St–p, serial correlation of error terms is eliminated by using
the variables, Dt–1, Dt–2, . . . , Dt–p. If the estimator of Ain the previous equa-
tion is signiﬁcantly equal to 0, they conclude the government bond is sus-
tainable.
Ihori, Nakazato, and Kawade (2002) conduct the empirical analysis for
the Japanese ﬁscal data from 1957 to 1999. To conduct the test, the values
for the nominal growth rate, n, and the nominal interest rate, r, must be
speciﬁed. Their strategy is to set various values for r – n and to check
whether the results are sensitive to the values chosen. The estimated results
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level, suggesting that government solvency was not a serious problem un-
til ﬁscal 1996. On the contrary, the result for the period 1957 to 1997 rejects
the null hypothesis when r – n is above 0.05, and the results for the period
1957 to 1998 and the period 1957 to 1999 also reject the null hypothesis
when r – n is above 0.04.
Bohn (1998) proposes a new method diﬀerent from existing tests for sus-
tainability of government debt. According to Bohn (1998), the test has bet-
ter properties than the tests based on estimating a transversality condition
and on cointegration tests. The condition that ﬁscal policy satisﬁes the in-
tertemporal budget constraint (i.e., the condition on sustainability of gov-
ernment debt) is that the primary surplus to GDP (st) increases with the ra-
tio of (start-of-period) debt to GDP (dt).1 Strictly speaking, when we can
express a relation between the two as
st   f(dt)    t
Suppose other determinants,  t, is bounded and the present value of future
GDP is ﬁnite. Then, government debt satisﬁes a transversality condition if
there is a debt-GDP ratio d∗ such that f (dt)    0 for all dt   d∗, where
  is a positive constant. We draw a scatter plot of st against dt in ﬁgure 11.1
(only the general account of the central government) and ﬁgure 11.2 (the
consolidated account of the central and local governments). Until the early
1990s, the Japanese ﬁscal policy held the quadratic relation between the
two. Recently, the Japanese ﬁscal policy deviates from the relation exces-
sively. Doi and Ihori (2004) show that Japanese government debt does not
satisfy a transversality condition for ﬁscal 1965 to 2000 by estimating  .
These observations indicate that ﬁscal sustainability may become a seri-
ous issue. The longer the sample period, the more likely we face the ﬁscal
crisis. It follows that the chain-letter mechanism will cause the public debt
crisis to occur in the near future. Japan has two serious diﬃculties in terms
of sustainability. First, the Japanese primary surplus is apparently a de-
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1. Broda and Weinstein (2005) point out that using gross debt levels to assess Japan’s ﬁscal
sustainability is equivalent to treating Japan’s ﬁnancial assets as worthless. They assert, there-
fore, that net debt levels are more appropriate to assess the ﬁscal sustainability than gross
debt. However, the following aspects need to be considered.
First, Broda and Weinstein (2005) calculate the value of net debt of the Japanese public sec-
tor by summing together the net debts of the Japanese government, postal savings, and gov-
ernment ﬁnancial institutions. Though this net debt of the Japanese public sector includes net
debt of social security, the assets of social security accounts are earmarked for the future pen-
sion beneﬁt payouts. Therefore, it is better, from this aspect, to exclude net debt of social se-
curity to assess the ﬁscal sustainability.
Second, if ﬁscal authority and monetary authority act noncooperatively, ﬁscal authority
has to take into account the possibility that the monetary authority sell government bonds in-
dependently. Therefore, it is important for the independent ﬁscal authority to assess the ﬁs-
cal sustainability without taking account of the government bonds held by the monetary au-
thority. Our analysis mainly deals with a noncooperative case so that we focus our attention
on gross debt levels.creasing function of the debt-GDP ratio since 1990 and hence it does not
satisfy Bohn’s test. Second, the rate of interest is greater than the growth
rate in Japan in the 1990s. Hence, it is important to reduce the government
deﬁcit in the near future.
11.2.2 Non-Keynesian Eﬀect
Many governments prefer to rely on the issuance of debt rather than ex-
plicit taxation in ﬁnancing expenditures. Recent experience suggests that a
number of countries are facing potential bankruptcy as a result of issuing
too much debt. As shown in Ihori (1988), the chain-letter mechanism
would most likely be sustainable when the initial interest rate and stock of
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Fig. 11.1 Primary surplus and government debt (the general account of the central
government)
Fig. 11.2 Primary surplus and government debt (central and local governments)government debt are smaller or when the propensity to save and the growth
rate are higher.
When the government goes eventually bankrupt, austerity measures as
ﬁscal reconstruction will be required. This will depend critically on the re-
sponse of the private sector to the speciﬁc austerity policy and more specif-
ically the response of capital accumulation. Serious mistakes, which will
possibly exacerbate the bankruptcy problem, may occur if the wrong ac-
tion is taken. The conventional wisdom suggests that either the government
must raise taxes or dramatically reduce spending. This is contingent on an
increase in capital accumulation taking place in response to the change in
policy. However, whether these contractions will be aﬀected through cuts 
in spending or increases in explicit tax collections and when these actions
will be taken are in general unknown. Expectations of future policy changes
are crucial in understanding seemingly counterintuitive macroeconomic dy-
namics. Bertola and Drazen (1993) argue that expectations about the dis-
crete character of future ﬁscal adjustments can help explain the eﬀects of
current ﬁscal policy. They showed that if government spending follows an
upward-trending stochastic process that the public believes may fall sharply
when it reaches speciﬁc trigger points, then optimizing consumption be-
havior and simple budget-constraint arithmetic imply a nonlinear relation-
ship between private consumption and government spending.
The so-called non-Keynesian eﬀect means that cuts in public expendi-
tures and/or tax increases contribute to stimulate private demand under
some ﬁscal situations or macroeconomic environments: that is, when gov-
ernment spending is ineﬃcient and/or the budget deﬁcit is so large, this para-
doxical eﬀect may occur. If this is the case, it becomes possible to attain
simultaneously two policy objectives of ﬁscal reconstruction and macro-
economic recovery. This possibility of so-called non-Keynesian eﬀect is
consistent with the experience of several countries.
Such a situation might be relevant for the recent Japanese economy. A
recent line of economic research suggests that private agents realize that
current bond-ﬁnanced deﬁcits carry with them future tax obligations. An-
ticipating higher future taxes, private agents change current spending be-
havior to smooth consumption intertemporally. Although the economet-
ric study of this issue is still in its infancy, some recent research indicates
that private Japanese behavior has partially oﬀset recent changes in ﬁscal
policy (see Ihori and Sato [2002] among others).
11.2.3 Emergency Reform for Debt Repudiation
In reality, however, it may be diﬃcult to employ the standard austerity
measures in a proper time. For example, Japan’s ﬁscal policy in the 1990s
created a problem of a tendency to postpone ﬁscal reconstruction reforms.
The consensus at the time was that there was no immediate need for such
painful measures as long as government policy prevented the economy
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private sector that the government would come to its aid if the economic sit-
uation worsened. That feeling fostered certain complacency in the business
world, making many corporate managers liable to moral hazards—risks
stemming from lack of self-discipline. The continuation of the short-term
stimulus policy, at a time when the economy needed long-term structural
changes, discouraged self-help eﬀorts in the private sector. Lobbying ac-
tivities of local interest groups were exaggerated in the 1990s, as shown in
Ihori, Doi, and Kondo (2001) and Doi and Ihori’s (2002) empirical evi-
dence. This is also one of the main reasons why Japan’s ﬁscal reconstruction
did not perform very well in the 1990s.
It is thus argued that if the current deﬁcits seem not sustainable, govern-
ments in such countries will be forced to in eﬀect repudiate their debt, ei-
ther explicitly through an introduction of partial default or through inﬂa-
tion depreciation (inﬂationary taxes). We may call such a policy change the
emergency reform for debt repudiation. The consequent ﬁscal reconstruc-
tion postponement is not free from credibility problems: Will the addi-
tional debt be paid oﬀ in full, or will the government ﬁnd it optimal to re-
sort to higher inﬂation or partial default to diminish the burden of the debt,
and so on? It should be stressed that if the private sector recognizes such
possibilities of future emergency reforms for debt repudiation, government
bonds and real capital may no longer be regarded as perfect substitutes.
The more likely the current deﬁcits seem not sustainable, the higher the
subjective probability of the future emergency reform.
11.2.4 Literature on Debt Ponzi Games Under Uncertainty
Several important papers investigated debt Ponzi games under uncer-
tainty. The average riskless rate may be a poor guide as to whether perma-
nent rollover of debt is feasible when economies are stochastic. Tirole
(1985) and Weil (1989) examine in the overlapping-generations framework
deterministic and speculative bubbles that are, like government debt, in-
tergenerational schemes based on trust. Weil considered a two-state model
with real capital and a bubble. The bubble has probability   of bursting
every period. The main result in Weil is that the highest sustainable bubble
(the equivalent of the highest sustainable debt in the present chapter) de-
creases with the probability of bursting (debt repudiation). Calvo (1988)
studies models in which debt repudiation is possible and shows that expec-
tations may play a crucial role in the determination of equilibrium. See also
Chari and Kehoe (1993), and Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989).
Blanchard and Weil (2001) show that whether or not governments can
rollover debt in dynamically eﬃcient economies depends on whether the is-
suance of public debt can partially substitute missing markets. Bohn (1991)
shows that the sustainability even of simple policy rules like balanced bud-
gets or tax rate smoothing should not be taken for granted in a stochastic
economy and that sustainability is often sensitive to assumptions about
384 Takero Doi, Toshihiro Ihori, and Kiyoshi Mitsuidebt management. Alesina, Prati, and Tabellini (1990) show that the ma-
turity structure of public debt may inﬂuence the likelihood of a conﬁdence
crisis on the debt. The shorter and more concentrated is the maturity, the
more likely is a conﬁdence crisis. See also Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).
11.2.5 Remarks
Economic theory has begun to catch up with political reality. It has done
this by not only studying the optimality of ﬁscal policy in a context where
explicit account is taken of the government’s budget constraint, but it has
also gone a step further by examining the time consistency of optimal pol-
icy. Here, it is the issue of whether it is optimal to keep promises that were
optimal to make in the past. The latter lies at the heart of the credibility
dilemma faced by any serious politician.
Fiscal regimes diﬀer across countries and change over time. At each
point in time there is uncertainty about the regime that will prevail from
then on. A high government deﬁcit ﬁnanced by debt can be regarded as un-
sustainable and therefore may be taken to signal future contractions in the
deﬁcits. The ﬁscal regime prevailing in an economy, as well as the type of
ﬁscal relationships expected to arise from such a regime, is an important
factor in determining the response of private agents to ﬁscal signals.
The sustainability question in stochastic models is an aspect of ﬁscal pol-
icy that deserves more attention in future research and in policy making.
11.3 Debt Management Policy of the Japanese Government
11.3.1 Japan’s Government Bonds
The Japanese government currently issues government bonds, which can
be classiﬁed into six categories: short-term (6-month and 1-year Treasury
bills); medium-term (2-year and 5-year bonds); long-term (10-year bonds);
super-long-term (15-year, 20-year, and 30-year bonds); government bonds
for individual investors; and inﬂation-indexed bonds. The short-term gov-
ernment bonds are all discount bonds. On the other hand, all medium-,
long-, and super-long-term government bonds, except for the 15-year
ﬂoating-rate bonds, are the bonds with ﬁxed-rate coupons. The 15-year
ﬂoating-rate bonds and the government bonds for individual investors fea-
ture a coupon rate that varies according to certain rules. The inﬂation-
indexed bonds are issued as the 10-year bonds to ﬁnance funds for the Fis-
cal Investment and Loan Program.2
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2. The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) has been called the second budget be-
cause the government initially used FILP to undertake projects it was unable to include in the
general account budget. Doi and Hoshi (2003) have a good summary of the structure, com-
ponents, and history of FILP and PSS, and provide estimates of the costs FILP has and might
impose on Japanese taxpayers; its appendix provides a further review of the literature. Also
see Cargill and Yoshino (2000, 2003).The planned issue amount of each JGB for ﬁscal 2006 is shown in table
11.1. In the past, there used to be some other types of government bonds. 
But after the August 1988 three-year ﬁxed-rate bonds, the September 2000
ﬁve-year discount bonds, the February 2001 four-year ﬁxed-rate bonds, the
March 2001 six-year ﬁxed-rate bonds, and the November 2002 three-year dis-
count bonds, these bonds have never been issued. The current maturity struc-
ture of the government bonds (outstanding basis) is shown in ﬁgure 11.3.
11.3.2 Theoretical Analysis of Debt Management Policy
We construct a theoretical model based on Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1997a, 1997b). We include potential possibilities of the government bonds
in the model in section 11.4. There are households, ﬁrms, the ﬁscal au-
thority (government), and the monetary authority (central bank). The
households live for two periods. The ﬁrms produce a private good by using
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Table 11.1 Planned issuance of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) classiﬁcation by
issuance methods and maturity (in billions of yen)
FY2005 initial FY2006 initial
budget (1) budget (2) (2) – (1)
30-year bonds 2,000.0 2,000.0 0.0
20-year bonds 9,000.0 10,300.0 1,300.0
15-year ﬂoating-rate bonds 9,600.0 9,100.0 –500.0
10-year bonds 22,800.0 24,000.0 1,200.0
10-year inﬂation-indexed bonds 2,000.0 2,000.0 0.0
5-year bonds 24,000.0 25,200.0 1,200.0
2-year bonds 20,400.0 21,600.0 1,200.0
Treasury bills 29,961.5 28,719.7 –1,241.8
Auction for enhanced-liquidity 600.0 600.0
Subtotal 119,761.5 123,519.7 3,758.2
Nonprice competitive auction II 2,658.0 2,658.0
Amount to the market 119,761.5 126,177.7 6,416.2
JGBs for individual investors 3,600.0 4,400.0 800.0
Amount to private sector (x) 123,361.5 130,577.7 7,216.2
Bank of Japan 23,043.6 16,557.4 –6,486.2
Fiscal loan fund 1,000.0 –1,000.0
Fiscal loan bonds (transitional measures) 19,300.0 15,200.0 –4,100.0
OTC sales at post ofﬁces 2,800.0 3,100.0 300.0
Amount to public sector (y) 46,143.6 34,857.4 –11,286.2
Total (x) + (y) 169,505.1 165,435.1 –4,070.0
Source: Ministry of Finance (2006).
Notes: Figures may not sum up to the total because of rounding. The amount of buy-backs
will be 12,800 billion yen in FY2006 (5,500 billion yen from the Bank of Japan, 5,500 billion
yen from the Fiscal Loan Fund, and 1,800 billion yen from the market). The limit of interest-
rate swap transactions will be 300 billion yen on the basis of notional principal for FY2005,
and will be 1,200 billion yen for FY2006. Nonprice Competitive Auction II is estimated at 3
percent of the primary auction.labor, at given price level, P t(t   1, 2). Their production functions are Y t  
Lt
 (0    1), where Yt denotes output, Lt denotes input of labor. Their
proﬁts are described as (1 –  t)PtLt
 – W tLt, where W tdenotes nominal wage
rate. The ﬁrms’ output is taxed at a rate  t, as will be described later.
The households organize labor unions, the objective of which is to ob-
tain a target real wage rate. They are assumed to make an expectation to
inﬂation rationally. We also assume that the unions have monopoly power
in the labor market. We can normalize the logarithm of real wage rate to
zero. Therefore, the (log of the) nominal wage rate is set equal to the (ra-
tionally) expected price level.
Under such a situation, the logarithm of output yt   ln Y t is written as
yt   ( t    t
e    t   ln  ),
where  t (P t– P t–1)/P t,  t
edenotes the inﬂation rate expected by the private
sector. Since  /(1 –  ) ln   is a constant, we set v    /(1 –  ), and normal-
ize yt as follows
(1) xt   yt   v ln   v( t    t
e    t)
Equation (1) is the Lucas supply function.
In a rational expectations equilibrium ( t –  t
e), if there exists no tax
distortion ( t   0), the normalized output is given as xt   0. This nor-
malized output level corresponds to the natural rate of employment, as
mentioned in Fujiki, Osano, and Uchida (1998). Moreover, the socially
 
 
1   
Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan 387
Fig. 11.3 Maturity structure of government bonds (outstanding basis)desirable output, x ˜
t, without any distortion of resource allocation is pos-
itive, because the socially desirable employment is allowed to exceed the
natural rate of employment, as pointed out in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1997a, 1997b). Hereafter, x ˜
tis assumed to be given as a positive constant
exogenously.
Next, we describe behavior of the monetary authority. The monetary au-
thority decides level of money supply in each period. We presume that the
quantity theory of money is held;3
   X ˜
t




t is given exogenously, the monetary authority determines the inﬂa-
tion rate directly through controlling money supply. Therefore, (Mt– Mt–1)/Mt
   t in this model.
Finally, we consider the government’s behavior. The government (or ﬁs-
cal authority) collects revenues from taxes, bond issuing, and seigniorage.
Its revenues are used for ﬁscal expenditures and repayment of government
bonds. The government can issue (inﬂation-indexed) bonds. We assume
that the government can issue only one-period bond and the pure expecta-
tion hypothesis of interest rate is held. In such a situation, the ﬁscal au-
thority faces the following budget constraint in each period;
P 1G1   (1   rB1)P 1B0    1P 1X1   (M1   M0)   P 1B1
P 2G2   (1   rB2)P 2B1    2P 2X2   (M2   M1)
where Gt denotes real government expenditures, rBt denotes interest rate of
bonds in period t, and Bt denotes the outstanding bonds at the end of pe-
riod t. B0, outstanding bond at the end of period 0, is exogenously given for
the government. The government chooses Gt,  t, and Bt.
Dividing both sides of the previous budget constraints by P tX ˜
t gives the
following budget constraints in share of nondistortionary (normalized)
output:
(2.1) g1   (1   r B1)b0    1      1   b1
(2.2) g2   (1   rB2)b1    2      2
where gt   Gt/X ˜, bt   Bt/X ˜. We presume that Xt   X ˜
t   X ˜ (a constant).
For simplicity, the real interest rate is assumed to be equal to the world
interest rate  , which is constant over time. Hence rBt   . From equations
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3. An economy in Japan is now mired in a liquidity trap. We would like to focus on the sit-
uation in which an economy in Japan escapes from a liquidity trap.(3) g1    (1    )b0    1      1  
11.3.3 Second Best Solution
In this subsection, we analyze the most desirable case with distortionary
taxes, in which the two policymakers are integrated and are committed to
their policy announcements. We deal with the situation in which the gov-
ernment and the central bank are integrated and are credibly committed to
their policy announcements. The credible commitment particularly im-
plies that the policymakers announce an inﬂation rate and commit them-
selves to the announced rate at the beginning of each period before nomi-
nal wages are concluded.
The society has the social loss function VS, which is represented by




t 1[  S t
2   (xt   x ˜)2    gS(gt   g ˜t)2]
where   S   0,  gS   0, and  S denotes the discount factor, 0    S   1. We
deﬁne g ˜
tas the government spending target as the optimal share of the out-
put realized without tax distortions or inﬂation surprises in period t. Now,
for simplicity of the analysis, g ˜
tis assumed to be constant over time: g ˜
t g ˜.
The policymakers minimize the previous loss function. The constraints
of each period consist of the Lucas supply function (1), the government
budget constraint (3), and the restriction generated by the rational expec-
tations formation of the private sector ( t
e   t). The optimality conditions
are given as follows:
(5.1) v2  t        gS(g ˜   gt)    t (t   1, 2)
(5.2)  1    S(1    ) 2
(5.3)  1      S(1    )  2    
(5.4) g ˜   g1    S(1    )(g ˜   g2)
Equation (5.1) is the static optimization condition in each period. Equa-
tions (5.2), (5.3), and (5.4) are the intertemporal optimization conditions
for inﬂation, tax rate, and government spending, respectively. For example,
if  S(1    )   1 (the discount rate is equal to the rate of interest), it is de-
sirable to have the same levels of inﬂation, tax rate, and government spend-
ing over time, respectively. This is a well-known smoothing condition over
time a la Barro (1979). See also Barro (1995, 2003).
Several remarks are useful. First, as Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a,















 2      2  
1   
g2  
1   
Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan 389ment debt outstanding. In the equilibrium, optimal value of VS is repre-
sented as
VS    (1    )b0   K ˜    ,
from equations (4) and (5). It means that the larger the initial debt b0, the
larger the social loss.
Second, the income tax and individual preferences of leisure and labor
aﬀect the production level of the nation.
Intuition is as follows. To maintain the neutrality of bonds toward social
welfare (social loss), it is necessary to issue bonds to cover the part of ﬁscal
expenditures and redemption that cannot be covered from tax revenues
and recoinage proﬁts while maintaining budget constraints and not dis-
torting the inﬂation rate, tax rate, and ﬁscal expenditures. Issuing bonds
should act as a buﬀer in the budget.
These results are the same as Beetsma and Bovenberg’s (1997a).
11.3.4 Numerical Analysis
In this subsection, we numerically examine the second-best debt man-
agement policy under commitment, which is theoretically analyzed in the
previous subsection. We can easily extend the analytical framework to a
more general multiperiod model. For the present numerical analysis, we
use a 200-period model and incorporate nominal bonds as well.4
In doing the numerical analysis, it is necessary to specify values of some
exogenous parameters in the theoretical model. Based on the data of Jap-
anese economy, we set   0.7,   0.04,  S   0.964,   S   2,  gS   3, 
x ˜   0.01, and g ˜   0.1. We also adapt   0.36, as mentioned in Fujiki, Os-
ano, and Uchida (1998).
We set the initial outstanding debt to (normalized) output ratio as 100
percent. Under such values of parameters, we derive numerical results by
expanding the model to 200 periods. Figure 11.4 shows transitions of gov-
ernment debt outstanding (to the desirable output ratio) in the upper ﬁg-
ure, and inﬂation rate ( ), government expenditure (to the desirable out-
put ratio: g), and tax rate ( ) in the lower ﬁgure. The upper ﬁgure suggests
that it is desirable to reduce the bond dependence ratio gradually to redeem
fully in the 200th period. The lower ﬁgure indicates the smoothing eﬀects




1   
 S    S(1    )   (1    )/[1    S(1    )2]
     
 2/  S   1/ 2   1/ gS
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4. The reason why we set a 200-period model is to weaken eﬀects of the terminal conditions
that all stock variables are zero, on this numerical analysis.11.4 Debt Management and Fiscal Sustainability
11.4.1 Default of the Government Bonds
As analyzed in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997a, 1997b), among others,
when monetary and ﬁscal authorities are not cooperative and not able to
commit their policy announcements, an optimally designed conservative,
independent central bank is necessary to establish the second best. The cen-
tral bank must be made more conservative than society. They showed that
correcting monetary policy preferences is a direct way to eliminate the dis-
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Fig. 11.4 Result of numerical analysis in the second-best case (outstanding bonds,
tax rate, government spending, and inﬂation rate)tortions due to the inability to commit. Drudi and Giordano (2000) showed
that since default risk increases as the maturity structure of the debt short-
ens, optimal maturity under bankruptcy risk is in general longer than in the
case in which debt repudiation policies can be precommitted or are very
much unlikely. See also Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987, 2005).
If we allow for political distortions, the preferences of the ﬁscal author-
ity may depart from the preferences of society. In the presence of political
distortions a debt target is also needed. For example, if the government dis-
counts the future too heavily, the optimal debt target would de facto act as
a ceiling on public debt.
In Japan, the central bank now acts as an independent policymaker and
its concern on inﬂationary targeting is more conservative than the govern-
ment. In this sense, we could say that the central bank behaves in a good
manner to attain the second best.
Let us explain this by including conﬁdence crisis of government debt and
spontaneous default of ﬁscal authority in the model introduced in section
11.3. Investors of government bonds decide whether they buy bonds or not in
prospect of behaviors of the government. If they can perfectly expect the gov-
ernment’s default, they do not purchase bonds at all. Hence we should inves-
tigate such a situation using backward induction. It means that a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is adopted as a solution concept in this section.
The ﬁscal authority and the monetary authority have individual loss
functions. Loss function of the ﬁscal authority is written as




t 1[  F t
2   (xt   x ˜)2    gS(gt   g ˜)2]
where   F 0,  gS 0, and  Sdenotes the discount factor, 0    S 1. Also
the loss function of the monetary authority is written as




t 1[  M t
2   (xt   x ˜)2    gS(gt   g ˜)2]
where   M     F   0. It implies that the monetary authority is more con-
servative in inﬂation than the ﬁscal authority. Each policymaker minimizes
the previous loss function, taking policies selected by the other authority
as given. In this section, we set that both policymakers decide policies si-
multaneously in each period. Investors of the government bonds have the
loss function (4).
Now, we describe a situation that the government triggers a debt default.
The government can declare the default before policies are chosen in this
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5. The real interest rate is assumed to be equal to the world interest rate. In addition, we ex-
clude the possibility of partial default by assumption. If, therefore, investors expect the de-
fault, the interest rate on the government bonds becomes inﬁnity.ever, the production in this economy is deteriorated due to the default. In
this situation, the Lucas supply function is assumed to include default
costs.
(1 ) xt   zv( t    t
e    t)0     z   1
where z is constant over time. It means that the production in default on
the government bond is z times as large as that in the normal situation, re-
gardless of the amount of the debt.
The constraints of each period consist of the Lucas supply function (1)
or (1 ), the government budget constraints (2). We also rewrite the govern-
ment budget constraints as follows,
(8.1) K ˜    (1    )b0    1          1   (g ˜   g1)   b1
(8.2) K ˜    (1    )b1    2          2   (g ˜   g2)
where K ˜   g ˜   x ˜/v. Note (xt – x ˜)2   z2v2[ t
e –  t    t   (x ˜/vz)]2 from equa-
tion (1 ), z 1 in the normal situation, and 0  z 1 in default of payment.
We assume that, in each period, the monetary authority cannot commit
the inﬂation rate announced at the beginning of each period before nomi-
nal wages are set. Under this situation, the policy authorities take inﬂation
expectations as predetermined. Such situation is represented in ﬁgure 11.5
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Fig. 11.5 The structure of the policy game
Notes: NC: nonconﬁdence crisis; C: conﬁdence crisis; D: default; ND: nondefault; P: policy
choice; F: ﬁscal authority; M: monetary authority; I: investors.11.4.2 Policy Choice in the Second Period
To solve for the two-period decision problem, we use the backward in-
duction method. Thus, we begin with solving for the solution in the second
period and then proceed to solve for the solution in the ﬁrst period. It im-
plies that such a policy is a time-consistent policy, which is analyzed in Lu-
cas and Stokey (1983), Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987, 2005), Calvo
and Guidotti (1990a, 1990b), and so on. In the second period, the ﬁscal au-
thority chooses { 2, g2} to minimize its loss function, subject to the budget
constraint (8.2). Also, the monetary authority chooses { 2} to minimize its
loss function, taking as given the expected inﬂation rate ( e
2), without any
regard for the budget constraint (8.2).
The Normal Case
If the government does not trigger a debt default in the second period,
we obtain the following conditions from the ﬁrst-order conditions for the
choice of { 2,  2, g2}, taking policies decided by the other authority and in-
ﬂation expectation and b1 as given,
(9) v(x ˜   x2)    gS(g ˜   g2)     M 2
Moreover, from the previous conditions and the government budget con-
straint and the restriction generated by the rational expectations formation
of the private sector ( t
e    2), the following relations are held
 2   [K ˜   (1    )b1]
(10)  2    [K ˜   (1    )b1]
g ˜   g2   [K ˜   (1    )b1]
where N    /  M   1/ 2   1/ gS.
Hence, the value of the loss function of the ﬁscal authority is
(11) V2
F   [K ˜   (1    )b1]2
where N∗
F     F/ 2
 M   1/ 2   1/ gS.
The Case of Default
If the government does declare a debt default in the second period, the
government may decrease its values of the loss function. Then, investors
would not buy the government bond in the ﬁrst period if they could predict



















394 Takero Doi, Toshihiro Ihori, and Kiyoshi Mitsuicannot issue the bonds in the ﬁrst period, and does not have any bonds to
default in the second period. Therefore, the government cannot trigger a
default in the second period.
11.4.3 Policy Choice in the First Period
In the ﬁrst period, investors of the government bonds expect the possi-
bility that the government may trigger a debt default.6 If they believe the
default occurs, they do not buy the bonds at all. This situation is conﬁdence
crisis. Under this situation, the government cannot newly issue bonds (b1).
If investors expect the default does not occur, the government bonds are
freely traded.
After that, the ﬁscal authority chooses { 1, g2, b1} to minimize its loss
function, subject to the budget constraint, equation (8.1). Also the mone-
tary authority chooses { 1} to minimize its loss function, without any re-
gard for the budget constraint (8.1).
The Normal Case Under No Conﬁdence Crisis (Case N)
First, we consider a situation that conﬁdence crisis does not occur. Un-
der this situation, the government can newly issue a one-period bond (b1).
The ﬁscal and monetary authorities minimize their loss functions in con-
sideration of situation in the second period. Thus the authorities in the ﬁrst
period have the following loss functions,
(12) V1
aN   [  a 2
1   (x1   x ˜)2    gS(g1   g ˜)2]    SV2
a
where a F, M. Va
2denotes the value of loss function in the second period.
V2
F is deﬁned as (11), and V2
M is obtained by assigning equation (10) to (7).
The monetary authority minimizes equation (12) regardless of the gov-
ernment budget constraint, taking policies selected by the ﬁscal authority
and inﬂation expectation and b0 as given. From the ﬁrst-order condition
for the choice of { 1}, we obtain the following condition
(13.1)  (x ˜   x1)     M 1
The ﬁscal authority minimizes its loss function.
(13.2)  (x ˜   x1)    gS(g ˜   g1)    ∗
N[K ˜   (1    )b1]
where  ∗
N  S(1   )N∗
F/N. From the previous conditions (13.1, 13.2) and
the government budget constraint, the following relations are held under
the rational expectations formation of the private sector ( t
e    1)
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6. As we mentioned previously, the government may default only in the ﬁrst period, not in
the second period. 1   [K ˜   (1    )b0   b1]
(14) g ˜   g1   [K ˜   (1    )b0   b1]
b1   [(1    )b0   K ˜    ∗
NK ˜ ]
where  2   (1    )/[1    S(1    )2N∗
F/N]
Therefore, we obtain the value of the loss function as follows
(15) V1
FN   [K ˜   (1    )b0   b1]2    S [K ˜   (1    )b1]2
   2
2[( ∗
N)2    S] K ˜   K ˜   (1    )b0 
2
The Case of Default Under Conﬁdence Crisis (Case D)
Next, we consider a situation that conﬁdence crisis occurs. Under this
situation, the government cannot newly issue any bond (b1   0), and trig-
ger a debt default in the ﬁrst period.
The ﬁscal and monetary authorities minimize their loss functions. If
once the government defaults on payments in the ﬁrst period, however, the
government has no debt in the second period, that is, there is no default in
the second period. Thus the authorities in the ﬁrst period have the follow-
ing loss functions
(12 )V 1
aD   [  a 2
1   (x1   x ˜)2    gS(g1   g ˜)2]    SVa
2⏐b1 0
where a   F, M, and Va
2⏐b1 0 : Va
2 with b1   0.
Also the production in this situation is determined by equation (1 ). The
government budget constraint in the ﬁrst period becomes as follows
(8.1 ) K ˜      1          1   (g ˜   g1)0     z   1
The monetary authority minimizes equation (12 ) regardless of the gov-
ernment budget constraint, taking policies selected by the ﬁscal authority
and inﬂation expectation as given. From the ﬁrst-order condition for the
choice of { 1}, we obtain the following condition
(16.1) vz(x ˜   x1)     M 1
The ﬁscal authority minimizes its loss function (12 ), subject to equation
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From the previous conditions (1 ), (16.1, 16.2), and the government bud-
get constraint (8.1 ), the following relations are held under the rational ex-
pectations formation of the private sector ( t
e    1)
 1    K ˜    
 1     K ˜    
(17) g ˜   g1    K ˜    
where H    /  M   1/v2z2   1/ gS.
Therefore, we obtain the value of the loss function in this case as follows
(18) V1
FD    K ˜    
2
   S K ˜ 2
where H∗
F     F/ 2
 M   1/v2z2   1/ gS.
Welfare Comparison between Case N and Case D
Whether the conﬁdence crisis occurs or not in the ﬁrst period depends
on welfare loss of the ﬁscal authority in each case. If the government de-
faults on payments, investors of the government bonds face losses. Thus,
they do not buy the bonds at all when they expect that the government will
trigger a debt default in the ﬁrst period.
If V1
FN V1
FD, the ﬁscal authority does not have any incentives to default
in the ﬁrst period. Hence, investors can purchase the government bonds.
We further analyze this situation.
V1
FN   V1
FD is satisﬁed under the following conditions
(19) 0  b0   K ˜    
  
When V 1
FN   V1
FD, that is, condition (19) is held, investors buy the govern-
ment bonds in the ﬁrst period. It means that there is no conﬁdence crisis in
the ﬁrst period under this situation. Otherwise, investors do not buy bonds
at all in the ﬁrst period. Thus conﬁdence crisis occurs in the ﬁrst period.
11.4.4 Numerical Analysis
In this subsection, we also numerically examine the previous situation,
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Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan 397extend the analytical framework to a more general T-period model. We will
describe the detail setting of this numerical analysis in the appendix at the
end of this chapter.
In this numerical analysis we introduce the maturity structure of the gov-
ernment bonds to make it more realistic. We adopt this structure in ﬁscal
2003 (settlement basis) in Japan. The maturity structure of the outstanding
debt is assumed to be given in table 11.2. These ratios mean composition
ratios to total amount of debt by remaining years to maturity. For example,
the ratio of the government bonds that has the remaining years to maturity
at less than one year is about 36 percent.
We also calculate the transition of policy variables in the realistic case
described in the previous sections. As we mentioned, in the realistic case,
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Table 11.2 Maturity structure of JGBs in ﬁscal 2003 (%)
Composition ratio






























30 0.20 1.07the government may trigger a debt default. Thus can the ﬁscal authority
avoid a default? Or does the authority have an incentive to default? We
consider whether the government defaults on payment under our calibra-
tion setting.
We set the value of parameters used in this model as the same in the
second-best case in section 11.3.4. Also we set z   0.9.
In the numerical analysis, we calculate the value of loss function of the
ﬁscal authority in case of default (Vt
FD) and the value of loss function in
case of no-default (Vt
FN) in each period, and then compare both values. If
Vt
FD   Vt
FN, the government in period t does not default. If Vt
FN   Vt
FD,
the government triggers a default.
In conclusion, under our setting in the 200-period model, we ﬁnd that
the ﬁscal authority could still avoid a default, fortunately. First, the upper
ﬁgure of ﬁgure 11.6shows the transition of outstanding debts. In this case,
the ﬁscal authority takes such a policy that the outstanding debt of gov-
ernment bonds ﬁrst increases and then decreases sharply near the last pe-
riod . This phenomenon seems to reﬂect the fact that the ﬁscal authority is-
sues government bonds strategically. And it suggests that the outstanding
debt in this situation does not exceed about 120 percent. It is consistent
with no default.
The lower ﬁgure of ﬁgure 11.6 shows inﬂation rate ( ), government ex-
penditure (to the desirable output ratio: g), and tax rate ( ). When the out-
standing debt of government bonds is large, the issuance of new bonds re-
sults in the debt default. Therefore, the large amount of outstanding debt
limits the ﬁscal authority to issue new government bonds. As a result, is-
suance of government bonds leads the ﬁscal authority to an advantageous
position against the monetary authority. In other words, the issuance of
bonds works as a credible threat to the monetary authority. This mecha-
nism leads the inﬂation rate to be higher, comparing to the second-best
case. Inﬂation rate becomes over 6 percent. In contrast, the tax rate is kept
low about 3 percent.
11.4.5 Intuitions of the Analysis and Policy Implications
According to conditions (19), the ﬁscal authority has an incentive to de-
fault when the amount of debt outstanding is more than a certain level. Ex-
pecting the debt default, the investors do not buy the public bonds at all.
The public bonds, therefore, cannot be sold when the issuance leads the
amount of debt outstanding to be more than the certain level. In this re-
spect, the ﬁscal authority has to take into account the upper limit of stocks
of public debt.
This possibility of debt default provides the ﬁscal authority to issue
public bonds strategically in the ﬁrst period. Suppose that the ﬁscal au-
thority, in the ﬁrst period, issues public bonds to be paid in subsequent pe-
riods in a multiperiod setting. The amount of issuance is, in addition,
Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan 399supposed to set to the extent that the ﬁscal authority has to raise the tax
rate to ﬁnance the government spending and/or cut the government spend-
ing itself in the second period because the additional debt issuance is lim-
ited due to the possibility of the default in subsequent periods.
This strategic behavior of the ﬁscal authority induces the monetary au-
thority, in a later period, to boost output and raise seigniorage revenues to
eliminate the distortion of resource allocation due to the limitation on debt
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Fig. 11.6 Result of numerical analysis in a realistic case (outstanding bonds, tax
rate, government spending, and inﬂation rate)issuance. Therefore, the monetary policy in a later period suﬀers from an
inﬂation bias from the ex ante point of view. Expecting such future mone-
tary policy, the ﬁscal authority has an incentive to issue more public bonds
strategically in an earlier period because it will lead the ﬁscal authority to
the advantageous position in the game played in a later period. This strate-
gic bias of the ﬁscal authority results in the distortion of the resource allo-
cation.7
There are two ways to eliminate this distortion toward successful ﬁscal
reconstruction. One of them is to make the monetary authority more con-
servative than society in the sense that the price stability weight of mone-
tary authority is higher than that of society. If the monetary authority is
conservative enough not to raise inﬂation depending passively on the
strategic accumulation of public bonds, the ﬁscal authority does not en-
gage in the strategic accumulation of debt in an earlier period. Conse-
quently the central bank should be more conservative to eliminate the dis-
tortion due to the strategic behavior of ﬁscal authority.
The other way of eliminating the distortion of the resource allocation is
to design an institutional ceiling on the debt issuance. This institutional
framework eliminates directly the distortion stemmed from the strategic
behavior of the ﬁscal authority. Needless to say, this direct ceiling does not
work eﬀectively if the ﬁscal authority has not issued public bonds to the ex-
tent that the amount of debt outstanding is close to the critical level of debt
default. It is therefore natural that the direct ceiling might not be necessary
for many countries, but it can provide a binding constraint of the public
bond issuance for the ﬁscal authority of Japan because it has accumulated
the debt outstanding much more than other countries.8
11.5 Conclusion
If the expansionary trend in Japan’s government spending continues at
this pace, the ﬁscal deﬁcit will inﬂate further and the ability to raise taxes
in the future will be politically limited. Investors will lose conﬁdence in
Japan’s public bonds if they believe that the nation’s public ﬁnance is bound
for long-term crisis. The result is that interest rates will rise and ﬁscal fail-
ure will become a more tangible reality.
This chapter has analyzed sustainability issues of Japan’s ﬁscal policy
and then discussed the debt management policy using theoretical models
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7. Since this strategic issuance of government bonds distorts the resource allocation form
the ex ante point of view, it is considered to be one of the time inconsistency problems.
8. One of the reasons why Japan has accumulated the debt drastically is related to the po-
litical situation of Japan in the 1990s. Especially after 1993, several parties formed a coalition
government. This instability of government party in the diet resulted in the delay of ﬁscal
structural reform toward ﬁscal reconstruction because the politicians have to take into ac-
count the possibility of dropping power when carrying out such policies.and numerical studies. We also investigated the desirable coordination of
ﬁscal and monetary authorities toward ﬁscal reconstruction.
We have also investigated conﬁdence crisis of government debt and
spontaneous default of ﬁscal authority. The ﬁscal authority has an incen-
tive to default when the amount of debt outstanding is more than a certain
level. Expecting the debt default, the investors do not buy the public bonds
at all. The public bonds, therefore, cannot be sold when the issuance leads
the amount of debt outstanding to be more than the certain level. In this
respect, the ﬁscal authority has to take into account the upper limit of
stocks of public debt. Our numerical study suggests that the ﬁscal author-
ity could still avoid a default in Japan.
We have also showed that for a country with large stocks of public debt
like Japan, the ﬁscal authority has an incentive to issue public bonds strate-
gically. This strategic bias distorts the monetary authority to increase in-
ﬂation too much. To eliminate this distortion bias and to attain ﬁscal re-
construction, an institutional ceiling on the debt issuance is one of the
eﬀective policy tools.
Appendix
Numerical Analysis in a Realistic Case
In section 11.4.4, we also numerically examine a realistic case, which is the-
oretically analyzed in sections 11.4.1 through 11.4.3. We can easily extend
the analytical framework to a more general T-period model. Now we in-
troduce maturity structure of the government bond. The government can
issue (inﬂation-indexed) bonds, and choose their maturity. The pure ex-
pectation hypothesis of interest rates is assumed to be held. In such a situ-
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where Bs,tdenotes the amount of bonds issued in period swith a prescribed
payout in period t and bst   Bst/X ˜. Note z   1 in the normal situation, and
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402 Takero Doi, Toshihiro Ihori, and Kiyoshi Mitsuiernment bond (B0v⏐v   1) is exogenously given for the government in each
period. The government in period t chooses gt,  t, btv(t   1   v   T ).
The Normal Case in the Final Period
If the government does not trigger a debt default in the ﬁnal period (pe-
riod T), we obtain the following conditions from the ﬁrst-order conditions
for the choice of ( T,  T, gT), taking policies decided by the other authority
and inﬂation expectation as given,
v(x ˜   xT)    gS(g ˜   gT)     M T
Moreover, from the previous conditions and the government budget con-
straint and the restriction generated by the rational expectations formation
of the private sector ( e
T    T), the following relations are held
(A.2)  T   (K ˜   bT)
 T    (K ˜   bT)
g ˜   gT   (K ˜   bT)
where bT   ΣT–1
s 0(1    )T–sbsT. Hence, the value of the loss function of the
ﬁscal authority is
(A3) VT
FN   (K ˜   bT)2
Policy Choice in Period T – 1
In period T – 1, investors of the government bonds ﬁrst expect whether
the government will trigger a debt default (in period T – 1 or the period T).
If they believe the default occurs, they do not buy the bonds at all. This sit-
uation is conﬁdence crisis. Under this situation, the government cannot
newly issue bonds (bT–1,T). If investors expect the default does not occur, the
government bonds are freely treaded.
After that, the ﬁscal authority chooses { T–1, gT–1, bT–1,T} to minimize its
loss function, subject to the budget constraint (A.1). Also the monetary au-
thority chooses { T–1} to minimize its loss function, without any regard for
the budget constraint (A.1).
The Normal Case (Case N)
First, we consider a situation that conﬁdence crisis does not occur. Un-



















Sustainability, Debt Management, and Public Debt Policy in Japan 403(bT–1,T). The ﬁscal and monetary authorities minimize their loss functions.
Thus the authorities in period T – 1 have the following loss functions
(A4) Va
T 1   [  a 2
T 1   (xT 1   x ˜)2    gS(gT 1   g ˜)2]    SVT
aN
where a   F, M. VT
aN denotes the value of loss function in the normal case
in the ﬁnal period. VT
FN is deﬁned as (A.3), and VT
MN is obtained by assign-
ing equation (A.2) to equation (7).
The monetary authority minimizes equation (A.4) regardless of the gov-
ernment budget constraint, taking policies selected by the ﬁscal authority
and inﬂation expectation as given. From the ﬁrst-order condition for the
choice of { T–1}, we obtain the following condition
(A.5.1) v(x ˜   xT 1)     M T 1
The ﬁscal authority minimizes its loss function and sets policies to sat-
isfy the following conditions:
(A.5.2) v(x ˜   xT 1)    gS(g ˜   gT 1)    N ∗[K ˜   bT]
From the previous conditions (A.5.1, A.5.2) and the government budget
constraint, the following relations are held under the rational expectations
formation of the private sector ( e
T–1    T–1)
(A.6) bT 1,T    T 1 K ˜   bT 1    ∗
N K ˜  ∑
T 2
s 0
(1    )T sbs,T  
 T 1    (K ˜   bT 1   bT 1,T)
   T 1 ∗
N K ˜   bT 1   [K ˜   (1    )3b03   (1    )2b13] 
 T 1    T 1 ∗
N
  K ˜   bT 1   [K ˜   (1    )3b03   (1    )2b13] 
g ˜   gT 1    T 1 ∗
N
  K ˜   bT 1   [K ˜   (1    )3b03   (1    )2b13] 
1
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s 0(1    )T–1–sbs,T–1,  T–1   (1    )/[1    S(1    )2N∗
F/N].
Therefore, we obtain the value of the loss function as follows
(A.7) VFN
T 1   (K ˜   bT 1   bT 1,T)2    S (K ˜   bT)2
   2
T 1[( ∗
N)2    S] K ˜   bT 1    K ˜  ∑
T 2
s 0
(1    )T sbs,T  
2
The Case of Default in the Final Period 
Under Conﬁdence Crisis (Case C)
Next, we consider a situation that conﬁdence crisis occurs. Under this
situation, the government cannot newly issue any bond (bT–1,T 0). The ﬁs-
cal and monetary authorities minimize their loss functions in considera-
tion of the situation in the ﬁnal period; whether the government faces a
debt default or not in the ﬁnal period.
At ﬁrst, we consider the case that default occurs in the ﬁnal period.
When the government does declare a debt default in the ﬁnal period, the
government budget constraint in the ﬁnal period becomes equation (A.1)
with z   0. Under this situation, we obtain the following conditions from
the ﬁrst-order conditions for the choice of { T,  T, gT}, taking policies de-
cided by the other authority and inﬂation expectation as given
(A.8) vz(x ˜   xT)    gS(g ˜   gT)     M T
Moreover, from the previous conditions (1 ) and (12), and the government
budget constraint (A.8) and the restriction generated by the rational ex-
pectations formation of the private sector ( e
T    T), the following rela-
tions are held
(A.9)  T    K ˜    
 T     K ˜    
g ˜   gT    K ˜    
Hence, the value of the loss function of the ﬁscal authority is
(A.10) VT
FD    K ˜    
2
Next we investigate policy choice in period T – 1. The authorities in pe-
riod T – 1 are written as
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T 1   [  a 2
T 1   (xT 1   x ˜)2    gS(gT 1   g ˜)2]    SVaD
T 1
where a   F, M. The monetary authority minimizes (A.11) regardless of
the government budget constraint, taking policies selected by the ﬁscal au-
thority and inﬂation expectation as given. Since this situation is the same
as Case C condition with respect to { T–1} in this case is (A.5.1).
The ﬁscal authority minimizes its loss functions in consideration of sit-
uation in the ﬁnal period. The government decides policies to satisfy the
condition,
(A.5.2 ) v(x ˜   xT 1)    gS(g ˜   gT 1)
Therefore, we obtain the value of the loss function in this case as follows
(A.12) VFC
T 1   (K ˜   bT 1)2    S  K ˜    
2
The Case of Default in Period T – 1 Under Conﬁdence Crisis (Case D)
Also, we discuss the situation that the government in period T – 1 trig-
gers a debt default under conﬁdence crisis. Under this situation, the gov-
ernment cannot newly issue a one-period bond (bT–1,T   0).
The ﬁscal and monetary authorities minimize their loss functions in con-
sideration of situation in the ﬁnal period. If once the government defaults
on payments in period T – 1, however, the government has no debt in the
ﬁnal period—that is, there is no default in the ﬁnal period. Thus the au-
thorities in period T –1 have the following loss functions
(A.13) V 
T 1   [  a 2
T 1   (xT 1   x ˜)2    gS(gT 1   g ˜)2]    SVT
aN⏐bT 0
where a   F, M. The government budget constraint in this period is (A.1)
with z   1.
The monetary authority minimizes (A.13) regardless of the government
budget constraint, taking policies selected by the ﬁscal authority and in-
ﬂation expectation as given. From the ﬁrst order condition for the choice
of { T–1}, we obtain the following condition
(A.14.1) vz(x ˜   xT 1)     M T 1
The ﬁscal authority minimizes its loss function (A.13), subject to (A.1).
The authority sets policies to satisfy the following condition:
(A.14.2) vz(x ˜   xT 1)    gS(g ˜   gT 1)
From the previous conditions (1 ), (A.14.1, A.14.2), and the government
budget constraint (A.1), the following relations are held under the rational
expectations formation of the private sector ( e
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 T 1     K ˜    
g ˜   gT 1    K ˜    
Therefore, we obtain the value of the loss function in this case as follows
(A.16) VFD
T 1    K ˜    
2
  βS K ˜ 2
Welfare Comparison Between Case C and Case D
Does the ﬁscal authority trigger a debt default under no conﬁdence cri-




T–1, the government does not trigger a default in period T – 1.
On the other hand, in the case of V2
FD   V2
FC, the ﬁscal authority has in-
centives to default on payments in period T – 1.
The details are as follows. In the case of K ˜   Nx ˜vz/1   z and D   K ˜ 2,
VFD
T–1   VFC
T–1 is satisﬁed under the following conditions
(A.17) bT 1     SK ˜2     (1     
S)D     K ˜,
These conditions suggest that the government has an incentive to default
when the amount of debt outstanding is more than a certain level.
Welfare Comparison Between Case N and Case C or Case D
Whether the conﬁdence crisis occurs or not in period T – 1 depends on
welfare loss of the ﬁscal authority in each case. If the government defaults
on payments, investors of the government bonds face losses. Thus, they do
not buy the bonds at all when they expect that the government will trigger
a debt default in period T – 1 or the ﬁnal period.
If VFN
T–1   min{VFC
T–1, VFD
T–1}, the ﬁscal authority does not have any incen-
tives to default in each period. Hence, investors can purchase the govern-
ment bonds. We further analyze this situation.
VFN
T–1   VFC
T–1   VFD
T–1 is satisﬁed, under the following conditions
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T 1[( ∗
N)2    S], bN,T 1   ( T 1   1)b2
T 1
   T 1 ∑
T 2
s 0
(1    )T sbs,t 
2
  2 T 1bT 1∑
T 2
s 0
(1    )T sbs,T   2K ˜bT 1
  2K ˜ T 1 1     bT 1  ∑
T 2
s 0
(1    )T sbs,T ,
bT 1    βSK ˜2     (1     
S)D     K ˜,
and
(A.17)  T 1  
2
On the other hand, VFN
T–1   VFD
T–1   VFC
T–1 is satisﬁed under (A.17) and the
following conditions
(A.19) 0   bT 1  ∑
T 2
s 0












  K ˜
and
 T 1  
When VFN
T–1   min{VFC
T–1, VFD
T–1}, that is, conditions (A.17 ) and (A.18) or
(A.17) and (A.19) are held, investors buy the government bonds in period
T – 1. It means that there is no conﬁdence crisis in period T – 1 under this
situation. Otherwise, investors do not buy bonds at all in period T – 1. Thus
conﬁdence crisis occurs in period T – 1.
Policy Choice in Period t
In general, in period t, investors of the government bonds ﬁrst expect
whether the government triggers a debt default in subsequent periods. If
they believe the default occurs, they do not buy the bonds at all. This situ-
ation is conﬁdence crisis. Under this situation, the government cannot
newly issue bonds. If investors expect the default does not occur, the gov-
ernment bonds are freely treaded.
After that, the ﬁscal authority chooses { t, gt, bts} to minimize its loss
function, subject to the budget constraint (A.1). Also the monetary au-
thority chooses { t} to minimize its loss function, without any regard for
the budget constraint (A.1). The structure of this policy game from period
T – 2 to period T, for example, is shown in ﬁgure 11A.1.
D    SK ˜ 2
  







1    SD
  







1   
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Fig. 11A.1 The structure of a policy game between ﬁscal and monetary policy au-
thorities
Notes: NC: nonconﬁdence crisis; C: conﬁdence crisis; D: default, ND: nondefault; P: policy
choice; F: ﬁscal authority; M: monetary authority; I: investors.
The Normal Case (Case N)
First, we consider a situation that conﬁdence crisis does not occur. Un-
der this situation, the government can newly issue bonds. The ﬁscal and
monetary authorities minimize their loss functions. Thus the authorities in
period T – 1 have the following loss functions
(A.4 )V t
aN    
1
2
 [  a t
2   (xt   x ˜)2    gS(gt   g ˜)2]    SVaN
t 1
where a F, M. VaN
t 1denotes the value of loss function in the normal case in
the ﬁnal period. From the ﬁrst-order conditions like (A.6), the value of the
loss function of the ﬁscal authority in period t in the normal case becomes
Vt
FN    t K ˜ ∑
T
s t
(1    )t s  ∑
t 1






 t   [(β∗
N t 1)2    S t 1]δt
2,  T   1, δ2   ,









   K ˜  ∑
t 1
s 0
(1    )t sbs,t   t 1 ∗
N K ˜ ∑
T
s t 1
(1    )t 1 s ∑
t 1
s 0 (1    )t 1 s∑
T
v t 1
bs,v   
1   
  




2N2The Case of Default Under Conﬁdence Crisis
Next, we consider a situation that conﬁdence crisis occurs in period t.
Under this situation, the government cannot newly issue any bond in this
and subsequent periods. If the government triggers debt default in period
t, we also obtain the value of the loss function of the ﬁscal authority in pe-
riod t in default case as follows
Vt,0






   t 1 K ˜ ∑
T
s t 1
(1    )t 1 s 
2
,
from the ﬁrst-order conditions like (A.14.1, A.14.2). Likewise, if the gov-
ernment defaults in period t   j (0   j   T – t), from the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions like (A.5.1), (A.5.2 ) and (A.9), the value of the loss function of the
ﬁscal authority in period t becomes
Vt,j
FD     j







    S
j 1 t j 1 K ˜ ∑
T
s t j 1






h t K ˜  ∑
t 1
v 0
(1    )h vbv,h 
2 
We deﬁne Vt
FD   min{Vt,j
FD⏐0   j   T – t}.
Hence, if Vt
FN  Vt
FD, the ﬁscal authority does not have any incentives to
default in period t. We numerically examine a realistic case based on the
above setting in section 11.4.4.
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Comment Dante B. Canlas
The Doi, Ihori, and Mitsui chapter (DIM henceforth) takes oﬀ from some
down-to-earth facts about the Japanese government’s budget deﬁcits and
the existing maturity structure of its bonds and other government debt pa-
pers. The backdrop is the collapse of the so-called bubble economy in the
early 1990s, the aftermath of which has been a prolonged economic slump
marked by modest and spotty episodes of recoveries.
The authors attempt to assess the sustainability of Japan’s debt policy by
using the theory of optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy to assess the story
behind the government’s actual ﬁscal policy choices. From the perspective
of a class of models that shares this theoretical platform, the writers try to
extract a consistent set of eﬃciency and welfare principles that could oﬀer
guidelines about the future conduct of ﬁscal and monetary policy.
The usual starting point for the theory that is put to work in the DIM
chapter is a government that consumes ﬁxed amounts of goods and ser-
vices. Prices and quantities are determined competitively. At some point in
time, the ﬁscal authority may decide to increase the existing pattern of gov-
ernment spending to be ﬁnanced not by a tax increase but by issuance of
government debt. This debt may be in the form of interest-bearing bonds
or noninterest bearing money. In this setting, the ﬁscal authority deter-
mines the level of the public debt while the monetary authority, the com-
position of that debt. The degree of independence enjoyed by the monetary
authority from the ﬁscal authority largely determines whether an income
tax at some future date or an inﬂation tax ﬁnances the budget deﬁcit.
Theoretically, one can assume, following Frank Ramsey’s (1928) canon-
ical growth model, the presence of a central planner, with the ﬁscal and
monetary authorities viewed as acting in a cooperative way. Both authori-
ties take their cue from the central planner who maximizes a social welfare
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